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Do Directors Have a Use-By Date? 
Examining the Impact of Board Tenure on Firm Performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate boards serve the dual important functions of monitoring and advising management. We 
examine whether corporate boards consisting of longer-serving independent directors are better 
able to fulfill these functions due to firm-specific knowledge accumulation, or whether director 
performance suffers due to declining effectiveness in monitoring managers and/or overall staleness 
of board capital (board value to shareholders). Using a broad sample of up to 3,800 firms over a 
20-year period, our evidence suggests that board tenure is positively related to forward-looking 
measures of market value and stock returns, with the relationship reversing after about nine years 
on average. The detrimental effect of longer average board tenure on market value (after an initial 
period of positive effects) is stronger for high growth firms, which is consistent with the 
deterioration of the board members’ ability to perform their advisory functions.  
Keywords: board tenure; firm value; abnormal returns; growth firms. 
JEL Classifications: G32, G34, G38, M41. 
Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The length of time directors stay on board (“board tenure”) is a controversial issue that has attracted 
the attention of professional investors, regulators, and academics. The call by institutional 
investors for board “refreshment” – allowing new members to enter the board – is driven by the 
desire for a more diverse mix of board members and by the conventional wisdom that long-serving 
board members become entrenched1. The thinking is that entrenchment leads to cozy relationships 
between board members and executives, thereby diminishing the ability of board members to 
effectively represent shareholders’ interests. A regulatory solution to this issue would be to limit 
director tenure by imposing a tenure limit.  
The corporate governance literature that examines the relationship between board tenure and firm 
market value is characterized by inconsistent findings. Some studies find that longer board tenure 
is detrimental to firm value, as it leads to the decrease of board independence (Vafeas 2003), 
governance problems (Berberich 2011), and lack of critical thinking by board members (Coles et 
al. 2015). On the other hand, a different stream of literature finds that board tenure is improving 
board’s functionality, as longer-tenured board members are less susceptible to pressure by 
managers (Beasley 1996, Schnake et al. 2005), are more knowledgeable about company operations 
(Rutherford 2007), and are more likely to curb opportunistic behavior by managers (Hamouda et 
al. 2013 and Dou et al. 2015). One potential reason for the inconsistent empirical findings may be 
related to the small samples used by these studies. Most existing studies are limited to case studies, 
extreme cases (e.g. companies with fraud or financial statement restatements), and specific 
industries. Another possible explanation for the inconsistent results is the inherent endogeneity of 
                                                          
1 Some recent news articles about investors’ concern regarding the length of directors’ tenure include Frances 
(2016), Murphy (2016), Stein (2016), and Vekshin (2015).     
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board selection, as board members might prefer to stay longer on boards of a better-performing 
companies, or shareholders of good companies might be reluctant to refresh a board when things 
are not "broken".  
In this paper, we view board tenure2 as a measure of how stable a certain mix of director capital3 
has been, and study how it impacts board effectiveness in value creation through its advisory and 
monitoring functions. On one hand, longer board tenure signals that the shareholders have 
appointed and maintained a board with the relevant mix of board capital. Therefore, an increasing 
tenure of a board can be viewed as a proxy for an able and well-functioning board that is positively 
contributing to firm value. However, even if a board has a relevant mix of capital to perform its 
duties effectively, board’s ability might be diminished by the board’s incentives to monitor 
managers. As board members’ tenure increases, they become more connected to the firm’s 
management and less motivated to effectively monitor managers. In addition to the indirect effect 
of board tenure on monitoring incentives, board tenure might have a direct effect on the relevance 
of board capital. With time, as a firm is changing, board capital might become stale and less 
relevant to the needs of the firm. Therefore, extreme values of board tenure can be signaling both 
boards’ disincentives to effectively monitor management and the staleness of board capital. This 
can lead to the negative impact of board tenure on firm value, and this latter effect is likely to be 
especially pronounced for fast-growing firms, where changing firm needs and strategic directions 
may cause faster deterioration of board capital.  
                                                          
2 Our measure of board tenure is the average board tenure of all independent board members of a given company, at 
a given year; therefore, our predictions and tests relate to this overall measure of board tenure and not to the tenure 
of individual directors.    
3 Following Hillman and Dalziel (2003), we define board capital as board member’s ability to perform their 
organizational functions.  
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In our study, we consider the relationship between board tenure and firm market value, as 
measured by both market-to-book ratio and stock returns. We study this relationship using an 
extensive sample of U.S. firm over 1996-2016. We find that longer average board tenure is 
positively related to both contemporaneous and future market-to-book. However, this relationship 
reverses at a certain point, roughly after eight to nine years of average board tenure. Beyond this 
“benchmark” for the average board tenure, we observe a deterioration in valuation that is especially 
significant for growing firms. For the stock return-based tests, we find that board tenure is reflected 
in stock returns in a similar manner to market values, and that the declining effect of long board 
tenure is similarly more pronounced for dynamic, growing firms. We also find that an investment 
strategy that holds long positions in stocks of companies with long board tenure (more than 12 
years of average tenure) and short positions in companies with short board tenure (less than two 
years of average tenure) earns statistically significant abnormal returns ranging between 0.49 and 
0.70 percent per month.    
Our results confirm and extend a study by Huang and Hilary (2018), who find that firm value, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, has an inverted U-shape for groups of companies sorted on the length of 
board tenure. Our most important contribution is to show that the relationship between board 
tenure and firm value is reflected in two forward-looking measures of equity value – next-period 
market-to-book and next month abnormal returns, while Huang and Hilary (2018) use only a 
contemporaneous measure of firm value. By using forward-looking measures of firm value and 
stock returns we are also mitigating the endogeneity problems inherent in prior studies. 
Additionally, we disentangle the effect of tenure on the board’s ability (board capital) by showing 
how a company’s growth options determine the relationship between board tenure and firm value. 
We show that firm attributes, such as its growth rate, impacts the optimal average board tenure, 
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suggesting that a uniform regulation limiting board tenure across companies and at all times may 
not be desirable. Finally, we have the largest sample used to-date to test the relevance of board 
tenure – up to 3,800 individual firms over a 20-year period.   
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the prior literature in the 
area, and Section III follows with hypotheses development. In Section IV, we describe the research 
design and the data used in the study. Section V presents the empirical results, with Section VI 
providing additional robustness tests on the relationship of firm value and board tenure. Section 
VII concludes.   
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2. PRIOR LITERATURE 
There is a substantial literature on the importance of tenure in explaining the performance of 
decision makers in different professions. For mutual fund managers, Chevalier (1999) finds that 
longer tenure helps them retain their job, as these managers are less likely to be terminated based 
on their performance, compared to younger portfolio managers. This “entrenchment” of longer-
tenured managers stems from their higher than average performance early in their career: in effect, 
they are branded as having superior skills and abilities going forward. However, their 
outperformance is mainly due to chance and later results in mean reversion (Porter et al. 2012). 
For credit analysts, tenure matters when it comes to their tenure covering specific firms for the 
rating agency: their optimism increases and accuracy decreases with tenure covering the firm 
(Fracassi et al. 2015).   Auditors’ tenure contributes to firm value up to a certain point in time, as 
reflected in equity risk premium, with the relationship reversing at the extreme values of tenure 
(Boone et al. (2008). CEO tenure is negatively affecting firm performance in dynamic industries 
because prolonged-tenure CEOs tend to develop a relatively fixed paradigm of managing the firm 
and unwillingness to accept new information or initiate strategic changes (McClelland et al. 2012). 
Politicians seem to be more effective in later periods of their tenure, as elections draw nearer. 
Ghosh (2006) finds that both property crimes and violent crimes in India go up in the initial years 
of an incumbent politician’s tenure and then decline in the later periods of their tenure, closer to 
re-election. Tenure does not seem to matter when it comes to academic performance. For example, 
Li et al. (2010) find that the productivity (total number of papers) and impact (citations of papers) 
of the economics and finance faculty from top twenty-five schools remains consistent before and 
after they attain tenure.  
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Prior literature looks for evidence that board tenure is a board characteristic that can have an impact 
on firm performance and firm value by influencing the director monitoring or advising functions. 
Empirical papers find contradictory results about the relationship between tenure and board’s 
monitoring function. Some researchers argue that seasoned board members over time become 
friendlier with managers and lose their ability to objectively examine managers’ actions, thus 
decreasing the level of board independence and contributing to the erosion of firm value. Board 
tenure is thus viewed as a proxy for the extent to which outside directors are affiliated with 
management. For example, Vafeas (2003) claims that, in time, directors might be co-opted by 
managers when directors become less mobile and less attractive to other companies. He finds that 
directors who stay on the board the longest are significantly more likely to have a fiduciary relation 
with the firm (so called “grey directors” – bankers, consultants, lawyers), are more likely to be 
affiliated with managers from the beginning of their board tenure, and tend to have more power 
and more equity ownership in the firm. Finally, he finds that this lack of independence is positively 
related to the amount of CEO’s salary. Following similar argument about the increasing lack of 
oversight by complacent board members, Berberich et al. (2011) find a positive association 
between director tenure and the probability that a company will experience some governance 
problems, such as bankruptcies, major litigations, major accounting restatements, or corporate 
scandals.  
On the other hand, another stream of literature argues that longer-tenured board members are in a 
better position to scrutinize senior managers because they are less susceptible to peer pressure and 
are less likely to be controlled by managers. Two event studies examine firms with corporate 
governance problems: Beasley (1996) looks at firms with cases of fraud while Schnake et al. 
(2005) examine firms with 10-K investigations. Both studies find that longer board service 
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increases the outside directors' ability to monitor managers more effectively to prevent fraud or 
10-K investigations. An association study by Sharma (2011) examines the role of board tenure in 
controlling managerial discretion over the use of excess cash flow as measured by the dividend 
payout policy. She argues that dividend policy is one area where conflicts between management 
and shareholders may occur and the board is the ultimate internal governance mechanism charged 
with protecting shareholders' interests. She finds that the tenure of independent directors is 
positively related to the likelihood of a dividend payout. Bonini et al. (2015) find some evidence 
that longer-tenured board members (with tenure over 20 years) are better at monitoring 
management actions because they gather and store valuable information about the firm and can 
share it with other independent directors. They find that such firms are more profitable and have 
higher market value.    
Similarly, researchers that examine how tenure affects the board’s advisory function find 
inconsistent results. On one hand, an argument is made that longer tenure of board members allows 
them to learn more information about the operations of the company, making it easier for them to 
understand the firm’s unique economic environment and financial reports, resulting in their 
improved ability to provide more informed advice to the management team. This, in turn, should 
result in a better-run firm. Studies that examine information-gathering practices of board members 
provide some support for this line of argument. For example, Rutherford et al. (2007) find that 
longer-tenured boards exchange information more frequently, as measured by the number of board 
committees. Additionally, a group of studies provide empirical evidence that better informed 
boards, as proxied by board tenure, provide better advice to managers that enhances the value of 
the firm. For instance, Muller-Kahle et al. (2011) show that financial service companies that chose 
to specialize in subprime lending and, and as a result, were negatively affected by subprime loan 
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defaults had board members with less tenure, as compared to “smart” firms that avoided these 
risky business practices. Howton (2006) finds that firms with longer tenure boards are more likely 
to survive after an IPO vs. firms that fail or are acquired, and Hamouda et al. (2013) show that 
more seasoned boards are more likely to curb predatory insider trading practices around share 
repurchase announcements.   
On the other hand, some studies of the relation between tenure and advisory function of the board 
hypothesize that board members might become complacent and stop learning about the firm’s 
operations the longer they stay on board. For instance, Coles et al. (2015) introduce a measure of 
groupthink – a way of thinking by cohesive groups where peer-pressure overrides the need for 
critical thinking. In the study groupthink is proxied by the length and the degree of overlap of 
board tenure. The study does not find support for the blanket prediction that groupthink has a 
negative effect on value for all types of firms, as measured by contemporaneous Tobin Q. 
However, the study does find evidence that the effect of groupthink on firm value is negative in 
dynamic industries, firms with smaller boards, and in firms that have boards with fewer outside 
connections. This is consistent with the idea that, holding group cohesion constant, the tendency 
to suffer from groupthink is harder to overcome in smaller boards and in boards with fewer outside 
connections.    
Several studies in the area look at the interaction of both monitoring and advisory functions with 
board tenure and study how it is reflected in firm value. Huang and Hillary (2018) find that the 
relationship between board tenure and contemporaneous firm value (measured by Tobin Q) is in 
the shape of an inverted U that reaches a peak at about nine years. They find that the value of 
companies initially rises, as directors acquire firm-specific knowledge early in their tenure. 
However, this continues only up to a certain threshold of tenure beyond which independence losses 
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outweigh the learning gains and board tenure becomes detrimental to firm value. Dou et al. (2015) 
find that directors’ performance improves with extended tenure. They find that longer-serving 
directors have a higher level of commitment, are better at controlling CEO turnover and CEO pay, 
have lower likelihood of intentionally misreporting earnings, and are also more likely to restrict 
the expansion of resources under CEO control (acquisitions are rarer and of higher quality).  
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We examine the relationship between board tenure and firm value within the framework developed 
by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) that considers both the direct effect of board capital on the 
monitoring and advisory functions of the board and the moderating effect of board incentives. 
Boards have two main functions: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders (monitoring 
function) and providing resources to the firm (advisory function). Effective monitoring by the 
boards lowers agency costs which in turn results in enhanced firm value (Fama 1980). Provision 
of resources by the board contributes to firm value by helping reduce dependency between the 
organization and external contingencies, diminish uncertainty for the firm, and lower transaction 
costs (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In order to be able to perform the two functions well, a board 
needs relevant board capital that consists of human capital (i.e. expertise, experience, knowledge 
of board members) and relational capital (i.e. connections that board members have to other 
organizations, prestige of directors, influence with political organizations, etc.).  
While board capital is the board’s ability to perform the two main board functions, board incentives 
influence the efforts that directors exercise in performing these functions. They can motivate board 
members to, for example, be more proactive in reaching out to their external connections to secure 
more favorable financing terms for the company. It should be noted that if a director has an 
incentive, but does not have the ability (for example, a director does not have the right banking 
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connection in the example above), s/he will not be able to perform this board function (i.e. secure 
good financing terms for the firm). In other words, board members’ ability to perform their 
functions are limited by the board’s capital, and board incentives can only moderate boards’ 
effectiveness in performing these functions. Exhibit 1 illustrates the relationship between the 
components of the theoretical framework described above.  
Exhibit 1 Board of Directors and Firm Value 
 
Boards with the relevant capital have the ability to monitor management and provide additional 
resources for the firm thus contributing positively to firm value. When investors are unhappy with 
director ability (capital), they refresh the board with a more relevant mix of board capital. 
Therefore, board tenure is a measure of how long a certain mix of director capital has been 
unchanged, and, in effect, longer board tenure signals that shareholders have appointed a board 
with the relevant mix of board capital. Increasing board tenure can be viewed as a proxy for an 
able and well-functioning board that is positively contributing to firm value. This leads to our first 
hypothesis in the following form: 
Board Functions
Monitoring 
Function
Board of Directors
Board capital Firm Value
Board 
incentives
Advisory
Function
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Hypothesis 1: Longer board tenure indicates that shareholders have selected board members with 
appropriate monitoring and resource provision abilities to meet the needs of the firm that 
contribute to the appreciation of firm value. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between 
board tenure and firm value. 
Both board capital and incentives determine the board performance. If a board has the ability to 
perform monitoring, this ability might be enhanced or diminished by board’s incentives to monitor 
managers. As board members’ tenure increases, they become more connected to the firm’s 
management through business dealings and social connections, and, as a result, more dependent 
of management. Board dependence on management will then act as a disincentive to monitor 
managers, negatively affecting the relationship between the boards’ ability to monitor and the 
actual monitoring of management. This, in turn, will lead to the increasing agency costs between 
managers and owners and will negatively impact shareholder value. In addition to the indirect 
effect of board tenure on monitoring incentives, board tenure might have a direct effect on the 
relevance of board capital. With time, as a firm is changing, board capital might become stale and 
less able to meet the needs of the firm. Without refreshing the board capital in time, shareholders 
might be running the risk of ending up with a mix of board capital that no longer meets the needs 
of the firm. Therefore, extreme values of board tenure can be, on one hand, signaling boards’ 
disincentives to effectively monitor management and, on the other hand, the staleness of board 
capital. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Beyond certain tenure threshold, we expect a reversal in the relationship between 
board tenure and firm value as board member’s capital becomes stale and board’s dependence on 
firm management creates disincentives for board members to monitor managers. 
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As we have outlined above, board capital determines its ability to perform its two main functions. 
In equilibrium, board capital maximizes firm value by providing required monitoring and advising 
services for a particular firm. However, as a firm changes its business strategy, shareholders will 
need to "rebalance" board capital and possibly appoint new board members that have the most 
appropriate human and relationship capital to meet the new needs of a firm. We expect that this 
rebalancing of board capital should happen more frequently for fast-growing firms, and those firms 
that do not rebalance in time will suffer from the deterioration in firm value. This reasoning leads 
to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The reversal of the positive relationship between board tenure and firm value is 
more pronounced for fast-growing firms.  
4. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The board data in this study is from the Capital IQ database for 1996 to 2016. It is extracted from 
the CIQ_Professional table, which includes data about professionals associated with various 
organizations. We first extract all observations with a valid CompanyID (it is used to link to the 
Compustat and CRSP databases), a valid PersonID (it links the individual across years and 
companies), and a valid start date. We identify board members as individuals with the following 
titles (Profunctionname in the table): "Chairman of the Board", "Co-Chairman of the Board", and 
"Member of the Board of Directors".4 We restrict our sample to independent board members only, 
i.e. those who are unemployed by the firm5. For each director-year observation, we then calculate 
the length of director board tenure. If an individual was elected to the board, for instance, in 1998, 
                                                          
4 Some companies have advisory boards, so it is important to focus on members of the board of directors. 
5 The results are unchanged when we include all board members in our tests. 
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we use 1998 to calculate that person's tenure in 1999 (one year later) and onwards. This way, in 
2005 that person's tenure is seven years.  
The dataset includes additional items such as director age, the ending date for the director position, 
whether the individual is a current board member, and the year in which the firm was founded. If 
the ending date is missing and the individual is a current board member, we set the end-year to be 
2017. If the ending date is missing and the individual is not a current board member, we set the 
end-year to equal the start year. We delete observations where the start year is earlier than the year 
the firm was founded or prior to 1945. To test the accuracy of the sample data, we examine the 
data for four companies, two large and two small, in the late 1990's and in the late 2010's against 
the proxy statements available in the SEC EDGAR database. We found a very high accuracy for 
the latter years, and some missing board members (less than 25 percent) for the early years.  
We obtain accounting data from the Compustat Point-in-Time database6 and stock return data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We require all companies in our 
sample to be incorporated in the US, have a positive book value and to be founded at least five 
years before we begin tracking their board tenure. To reduce the bias caused by smaller firms, we 
require a market value in excess of $100 million, and a minimum of three independent members 
on the board. Throughout our research we standardize accounting and stock return variables to a 
normal distribution, bound between plus and minus three to deal with outliers in the data. As a 
robustness check, we re-perform our tests using winsorized variables and the results are 
unchanged. For all other level-based variables we use the natural logarithm to manage outliers. 
                                                          
6 Charter Oak Compustat Add-On Database reports preliminary, un-restated, first-reported earnings filed with the 
SEC. This eliminates the discontinuities that result from subsequent restatements and provides a more accurate 
picture as to what fundamentals the company disclosed to investors at a particular point in time. 
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4.2 Research Design 
To test our hypotheses, we focus on the relationship between board tenure and two measures of 
firm performance: 1) firm value, as proxied by market-to-book; and 2) stock returns.  
4.2.1 Firm Value and Board Tenure 
We examine the relationship between firm value and board tenure in both univariate and 
multivariate settings. For the univariate test, we rank all firms in our sample into deciles based on 
the average board tenure (“tenure deciles”). We industry-adjust the measure of firm value by 
subtracting, annually, the median market-to-book for the firm’s industry using the Fama-French 
48-industry classification. We then examine the median values of the industry-adjusted market-to-
book values across different tenure deciles. Next, we examine the relationship between board 
tenure and firm value in a multivariate setting. First, we estimate the relationship between board 
tenure and contemporaneous firm value to test prior findings by researchers on a larger sample of 
firms7. To do this, we estimate variations of the following model: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡      (1)  
We calculate our main variable of interest, Tenure, by taking the average board tenure of all 
independent board members for each firm for each year. In order to account for the expected non-
monotonic relationship of a particular form of board tenure and market value, we also include a 
squared Tenure term. We include control variables that capture both firm and board characteristics 
previously shown to be related to firm value. For board controls we include Board size, the number 
of independent directors on the board, Average Age, the average age of independent directors on 
                                                          
7 The largest sample used in the previous studies of board tenure is the one used by Huang and Hillary (2018). It 
includes all firms in S&P 1500 over the period 1998 to 2010 – 13,989 firm-year observations. In comparison, our 
sample consists of 34,082 firm-year observations over the period 1996-2016. 
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the board, Connections, the average number of boards that directors are serving on, including the 
current firm board, and Chair CEO, an indicator when the CEO also serves as board chair. 
Yermack (1996) establishes the value relevance of board size. We add Average Age as a control 
variable to disentangle the effect of board tenure from the director’s age. Well-connected boards 
likely add to firm value by providing better advice to managers, due to for information transmission 
between companies (Larcker 2013) and their ability to affect business relationships with other 
firms; Connections controls for this enhanced advisory function due to the board centrality. Goyal 
and Park (2002) show that CEO duality (Chair CEO) makes it harder for boards to dismiss an 
ineffective CEO and results in the inferior firm performance.  
For firm controls, we use Annual sales (Sales12m), firm age (Firm Age), and number of business 
segments (SegNum) to control for size and complexity, which may affect the advisory role of board 
members. Growth opportunities of the firms are captured by Intangibles (scaled by Total Assets), 
Leverage (scaled by Total Assets), and R&D intensity (scaled by Sales). Firm profitability is 
controlled by two ROA variables – one for current and one for next period. We also include 
standard deviation of daily stock returns during the prior calendar year (StdRet), as a proxy for 
firm stability. We rely on prior studies to select firm and board controls, such as Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), Denis and Sarin (1999), Bhagat and Black (2001), and Baker and Gompers 
(2003). 
Model (1) is first estimated as a panel regression with industry and year fixed effects8. Next, to 
examine the stability of the relationship between board tenure and firm value through time, we run 
                                                          
8 As a robustness check, we estimate the model with firm and year fixed effects; the results remain unchanged. 
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cross-sectional regressions annually and calculate the time-series average of the coefficients and 
report t-statistics using the time-series standard error of the mean.  
A common concern in empirical corporate governance research is the impact of reverse causality. 
When it comes to board tenure, directors might be interested in staying longer on the boards of 
better performing firms, or firms with good performance might be reluctant to “refresh” the board, 
following a do-not-fix-what-ain't-broken line of reasoning. As an attempt to address this 
endogeneity concern we use forward (instead of contemporaneous) values of market-to-book as a 
dependent variable in model (1) (an approach adopted by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)). 
Following Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), we use contemporaneous values of market-to-book as an 
additional dependent variable:  
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡+1   
=  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (2)  
Next, we test the effect of the growth option on the value relevance of board tenure using panel 
regressions and Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regressions on firm-level data. We modify model 
(1) by adding an interaction of growth option proxies with a squared Tenure term and by including 
the growth option proxy as a control variable. Specifically, we estimate: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡   
=  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 
+ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                           (3) 
We use four proxies for firm growth options: (i) R&D, an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s ratio of research and development expenses to sales is over the 75th percentile value for all 
firms for that year. We choose the 75th percentile value because the median R&D for the firms in 
the sample is zero. The level of R&D captures the extent of resources that the company dedicates 
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to development of new products. (ii) SalesGrowth1, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s 
sales growth is above the median value of other firms in that year. Sales growth captures the scale 
of growth experienced by the company. (iii) SalesGrowth3, an indicator variable equal to one if 
firm’s three-year sales growth is above the median value of other firms for the year. We use 
SalesGrowth3 to capture longer-run growth effects. (iv) Fluidity, an indicator variable equal to one 
if firm’s Fluidity score is above the median value of other firms for the year. Fluidity score is a 
growth measure developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) and is available from the 
online data at http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/industryconcen.htm. It is derived from the 
descriptions of general business in the firms’ annual financial statements, and it reflects tactics 
adopted by the competitor firms. Fluidity score is higher when the words in the firm’s business 
description overlap more with the words of the rivals’ business description.   Hoberg et al. (2014) 
argue that fluidity scores capture changes in rival firms’ products and reflect the pressures firms 
face from the competitor firms. 
4.2.2 Stock Returns and Board Tenure 
In our second set of tests, we investigate the relationship between board tenure and stock returns. 
All of these return-based tests focus on the ability of board tenure to explain future one-month 
abnormal stock returns. Evaluating the ability of board tenure to explain future stock returns is a 
strong test to further address concerns surrounding causality and endogeneity.  
First, we perform simple univariate sorts of stocks based on board tenure, and examine the pattern 
of excess stock returns. This allows us to examine any linear and non-linear relationships between 
board tenure and future stock returns. Each month we separate all firms into quintiles and deciles 
based on Tenure. We carry forward the board tenure measure computed at the end of a calendar 
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year over the next 12 months. We use three different measures of abnormal stock returns. First, 
X_RET is the excess stock return, defined as the monthly raw stock return in excess of the 
capitalization-weighted market return. Second, DGTW_RET is the characteristic adjusted excess 
return of a stock computed using the Daniel et al. (1997) methodology. In Daniel’s approach, 
DGTW_RET is the buy and hold return on a security minus the capitalization-weighted average 
buy and hold return on a portfolio of firms with similar size (three groups), B/M (three groups) 
and 11-month momentum (three groups). Third, FF_RET is a measure of risk adjusted return, 
defined as the intercept of a four-factor model that includes three Fama-French factors and 
momentum (see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997)): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∙ [𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡] + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡                           (4)  
Second, we examine the relationship between firm abnormal returns (DGTW_RET) and board 
tenure in a multivariate setting. We use a Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regression model, 
including the previously described board and firm controls: 
𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+1   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                                   (5)      
Each month end, we estimate the cross-sectional regression Model (5). We then calculate the time-
series average of the coefficients and report t-statistics using the time-series standard error of the 
mean coefficient. 
In our third set of stock return tests, we examine the value relevance of board tenure for predicting 
stock returns of high growth firms using Fama-MacBeth regressions on firm-level data:  
𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+1 
  
=  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦
+ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                              (6) 
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We use five proxies for firm growth options similar to Model (3) and add Market-to-Book as an 
additional proxy for growth. Market-to-Book is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if 
firm’s market-to-book ratio is above the median value of other firms for the year. Market-to-book 
ratio is higher for high growth firms as market price is factoring a higher expected future growth 
for the firm and a higher return on its assets. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 plots the firm-year observations for our sample. Our final sample comprises of 638,717 
firm-month observations, with 1,335 individual firms at the beginning of our sample period (year 
1996) going up to 3,802 in 2006 and coming down after the financial crisis to 3,152 individual 
firms in 2016.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Table 1 presents important firm and board characteristics of companies in our sample. An average 
independent director serves on the board for six years (Tenure has 6.7 mean and 6.0 median), is 
58 years old, and sits on three boards (mean for Connections is 2.80). Boards have seven 
independent directors on average and in about 36% of firms the CEO also serves as board chair. 
Our sample firms are fairly large, with average market capitalization of $5.9 billion and sales of 
$4.4 billion. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Examining the correlations of Tenure with firm characteristics, we note that firms with longer-
tenured board members are older (correlation of 34 percent with Firm Age), more profitable (7 
percent correlation with ROA) with low-volatile stock returns (negative correlation of 19 percent 
21 
 
with StdRet). All this confirms our expectation that board tenure is a proxy for firm stability. The 
correlation of Tenure and our proxies for firm growth are all negative, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that higher Tenure is more damaging to high-growth firms. Panel B reports the 
correlation between our various proxies for growth: these variables have generally positive 
correlations with each other. 
5.2 Board Tenure and Firm Value 
In this section, we test our hypothesis of the effects of board tenure on firm value, proxied by 
Market-to-Book. We focus on three issues: effect of board tenure on contemporaneous firm value, 
effect of board tenure on forward-looking measure of firm value, and the effect of board tenure on 
the value of high-growth firms. Our analysis for each is discussed below. 
For our univariate tests, we rank firms each year into deciles based on the board tenure and examine 
the values of industry-adjusted Market-to-Book values across the deciles. Figure 2 plots the 
average and median board tenure values across the deciles. The length of director tenure ranges 
from less than 2 years (first decile) to more than 14 years (highest decile). Figure 3 shows how 
firm values change across the tenure deciles. Initially, firm value is increasing with the length of 
director tenure: for example, if a firm has a high director turnover (firms in the lowest decile of 
tenure – D1), it is valued about 5% lower than other firms in the industry in terms of its market-
to-book ratio. However, if directors remain on board for four to five years (D3-D4), firm’s 
valuation is at par with its peers. The highest valuation premium (3% above the median for the 
industry) is achieved by the boards with nine years of tenure, after which the valuation ratio starts 
to decline.   
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here 
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Next, we test our hypothesis in a multivariate setting. Table 2 presents the results of panel 
regressions for Model (1).  In the first specification, we include only board tenure as a dependent 
variable and observe an insignificant statistical relationship. However, once we include a squared 
tenure term in the second specification, the coefficient on Tenure become statistically significant 
and positive, while the coefficient on the squared Tenure term is significantly negative. As we 
include further controls in regression (3) and (4), we see that the coefficients for Tenure and 
squared Tenure term remain significant at the 1% level.  This confirms our prediction that, on 
average, board tenure is positively related to firm value, but the contribution to firm value begins 
decreasing at some point and longer board tenure beyond this critical point becomes a drag on firm 
valuation.  
The coefficients on firm controls in the regression are consistent with our expectations: controls 
for size (Sales, SegNum) are negative and significant, while controls for growth (Intangibles, 
Leverage, R&D, and ROA) are positive and significant. Consistent with our expectations, StdRet, 
our additional control for stability, is negative and significant. Turning to board controls, we find 
that Average Age is negatively related to market value, which is consistent with the expected 
associations in the corporate governance literature that older directors are less active in monitoring 
managers’ performance (e.g., Core et al. 1999). For Board Size we observe a positive relationship, 
contrary to the association established by Yermack (1996), which can be explained by the 
differences in the time frame between our studies. We observe a positive and significant coefficient 
for Connections, which is consistent with findings by Larcker (2013). Companies that have a CEO 
who is also a chair of the board seem to be valued higher: the coefficient on Chair CEO is positive 
and significant. This finding contradicts Goyal and Park 2002, which again might be due to the 
differences between the sample periods and sample sizes. 
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Insert Table 2 here 
As a robustness check, we examine model (1) cross-sectionally for each year in our sample. The 
coefficients from the annual regressions, as well as average coefficients and Fama-Macbeth t-
statistics are reported in Table 2 Panel B. We only show the coefficients and t-statistics for Tenure 
and Tenure Squared; but indicate for each regression whether industry, firm, and board controls 
are included. Similar to our panel regression results, we continue to observe a positive and 
significant coefficient for Tenure and negative and significant coefficient for the squared Tenure 
term for most years in our sample.  
We recognize that our results might be affected by possible endogeneity of our board tenure 
constructs. As an attempt at addressing these endogeneity concerns, we estimate the statistical 
association between Tenure and firm value using next-period market-to-book as a dependent 
variable, while controlling for market-to-book ratios in the current year. The results (presented in 
Table 3) continue to confirm our prediction of a positive relationship between Tenure and firm 
value (positive and significant coefficient for Tenure), with the relationship deteriorating beyond 
a certain point (negative and significant coefficient for the squared term). The results in Table 3 
suggest that our findings in Table 2 are robust to potential econometric problems induced by 
endogenous independent variables. Furthermore, it reveals that while board tenure effects are 
associated with contemporaneous market-to-book, the market does not appear to fully appreciate 
the importance of board tenure and the positive effect of tenure persists in the forward-looking 
measure of equity value. This finding strengthens our expectation that the positive effect of board 
tenure is also reflected in stock returns.    
Insert Table 3 here 
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The results of our analysis of value relevance of board tenure for growth firms are presented in 
Table 4 (Panel A shows the results of panel regressions and Panel B – Fama-MacBeth style 
regressions). The results indicate that tenure is negatively related to firm value for high-growth 
firms: the coefficients on the interaction of all growth proxy dummies and the squared Tenure term 
are negative for all proxies and significant in most cases. In all four specifications, Tenure remains 
positively associated with firm value, while the squared Tenure term remains negative, which is 
consistent with our previous findings. Overall, the results in Table 4 provide evidence that 
confirms our prediction that longer Tenure is detrimental to the market value of high growth firms 
beyond a certain point. Our growth option analysis provides some evidence that the relationship 
between board tenure and firm value can be further refined by factoring in additional firm-specific 
attributes.  
Insert Table 4 here 
5.3 Board Tenure and Stock Returns 
The analysis presented above suggests that increasing board tenure is positively related to firm 
value up to a certain point, after which board tenure becomes a drag on firm valuation. This 
relationship holds for both contemporaneous and forward-looking measure of market value. The 
latter finding, in particular, suggests that a similar relationship may hold for stock returns. If so, 
this would allow for a portfolio strategy that exploits the information content of board tenure. We 
investigate this further by studying the hypothetical portfolio returns investors could have 
generated by buying firms with certain board tenure attributes.    
The first two columns in Table 5 present average abnormal monthly returns (X_RET and 
DGTW_RET) for quintiles and deciles of portfolios formed based on Tenure. Both measures of 
abnormal returns are increasing monotonically to the middle of the Tenure range with the highest 
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value at sixth decile: 0.41 percent monthly return for X_RET and 0.26 for DGTW_RET. In deciles 
seven through ten, both X_RET and DGTW_RET start to flatten out and decline. The magnitude of 
the spread return earned by investor who takes a long position in the highest quintile/ decile of 
stocks ranked on Tenure and a short position in the lowest groups range from 0.70 percent to 0.49 
percent per month (statistically significant at the 1% level). However, it appears a more appealing 
strategy would be to go long on the firms in the middle groups of stock sorted on tenure, while 
shorting firms within the lowest Tenure group (monthly returns on this strategy would be up to 
0.74 percent for X_RET and 0.72 percent for DGTW_XRET). 
Our additional measure of abnormal returns is the intercept (FF_RET) of a four-factor model that 
includes three Fama-French factors and momentum, as specified in Model (4). The intercept from 
these regressions follows a pattern that is similar to that of X_RET and DGTW_RET: the spread 
abnormal returns range from 0.51% for the quintiles of Tenure portfolios (Panel A) to 0.72% for 
the deciles (Panel B).  
Insert Table 5 here 
Figure 4 plots X_RET, DGTW_RET and FF_RET for the deciles of portfolios formed on board 
tenure. For all three measures the pattern is similar to the inverted U-shape for market value 
observed in Figure 3. These results verify that the relationship observed between board tenure and 
firm value is also reflected in various measures of excess stock returns. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Next we test whether the relationship between stock returns and board tenure holds in a 
multivariate setting. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we regress characteristic-adjusted 
excess returns (DGTW_RET) on Tenure and the squared Tenure term, including firm, board and 
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industry controls, as specified in Model (5). We use time-series means and t-statistics for statistical 
inference. As Table 6 reveals, the coefficient on Tenure is positive and significant across all 
specifications, verifying an overall positive relationship between Tenure and excess returns. For 
regression (1), we find that in a univariate regression board tenure is positively related to future 
returns and is significant, unlike our findings for market-to-book.  
Insert Table 6 here 
The relationship between board tenure and future returns can be strengthened by including a 
quadratic tenure term. In regression (2) we include a squared board tenure term and find the 
coefficient on board tenure is now two times the size as the comparable coefficient in regression 
(1). Moreover, the squared term in regression (2) is negative and significant at the 5% level. Once 
we control for firm and board effects, the board tenure coefficients and significance are only 
modestly reduced, demonstrating the strength of the result. This confirms our prediction that board 
tenure is a positive for firms up to a certain point; however, after that further benefits do not arise 
for shareholders.  
We now revisit our predictions that for high-growth firms the deterioration of firm value will show 
at the earlier stages of board tenure. We investigate whether the evidence from Table 4 suggesting 
that long board tenure is especially damaging to the market value of high-growth companies also 
holds for stock returns. Table 7 repeats the analysis performed in Table 4, adding one more proxy 
for growth – Market-to-Book. Specifically, we regress our measure of excess stock returns 
(DGTW_RET) on the interaction of the squared Tenure term and the growth dummy, keeping all 
other controls used in model (4). The results in Table 7 are weaker but consistent with the evidence 
uncovered previously in Table 4: the coefficient on the interaction variable is negative and 
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statistically significant in one specification, while the rest of proxies seem to be statistically 
insignificant. The Tenure term is consistently positive and significant, while the squared term 
remains negative and significant.    
Insert Table 7 here 
5.4 Analyst Return Expectations 
Our results provide some evidence that board tenure is positively contributing to firm value. 
However, it appears that at the same time market participants continue to underprice board tenure 
in their valuation decisions, as we show that the length of board tenure is also reflected in the 
forward-looking measure of firm value and the next-period stock returns. Market participants 
might be consistently underpricing board tenure as it belongs to the subset of qualitative firm 
characteristics that are not directly related to firm’s operating efficiency and, therefore, might be 
more difficult to factor in the valuation analysis. In order to test if market participants are 
efficiently pricing board tenure, we examine the expectations of equity analysts following the 
methodology of Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2008). We consider analysts’ target prices one year 
into the future for stocks in our sample and use them to calculate the implied expected returns as 
the ratio of the target price to the current price minus one. Table 8 examines the mean and median 
of implied expected returns of the portfolio deciles sorted on board tenure. We can see that analysts 
have lower return expectations for high-tenured stocks than stocks with low board tenure: they 
expect that the stock price of a firm with 1.4 years of average directors’ tenure would appreciate 
by 51% per year, while a firm with 14 years of director’s tenure would appreciate only by 35%. 
The difference is even larger if we examine the medians: firms with the most refreshed boards are 
expected to appreciate by 37% more vs. the firms with the most stale boards. The difference in 
analyst expectations is statistically significant both for the mean and median measurements of 
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implied returns. It appears that even sophisticated market investors, such as financial analysts, do 
not factor board tenure characteristics in their projections, as their expectations seem to be 
inconsistent with the higher ex-post returns earned by longer-tenured firms.     
Insert Table 8 here 
6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
Our research is not without inherent limitations. This section presents the results of additional tests 
to check the robustness of the main results. Specifically, we consider whether our results are driven 
by: 1) our sample selection, 2) our design of board tenure measure, 3) behavior of executive board 
members, 4) our selection of linear model to capture nonlinear relationship between firm value 
and board tenure, and 5) adverse selection of long-tenured board members. Additionally, in order 
to align our monthly return tests with the tests that use book-to-market as a dependent variable, we 
perform tests of the relationship between board tenure and stock returns by using annual stock 
returns as our dependent variable.      
6.1 Sample Selection 
Our results might be driven by the sample selection. First, we have fewer observations in the early 
years of our sample. Additionally, it is possible that the database started counting the length of 
tenure from the point of time that a director is added to the database. This would bias tenure in the 
early years of our sample to be shorter than it actually was. In order to address this concern, we 
separate our sample into two groups: a group of observations for the period of 1996-2003 and a 
group of observations for the period of 2004-2014. We test whether the relationship between board 
tenure and firm value and monthly returns holds for the two groups: Panel A of Table 8 reports the 
regression results. For both sub-periods we find results that are consistent with our main findings. 
In particular, board tenure is positively related to firm value up to a certain point, after point the 
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positive relationship reverses. This reversal is reflected in the negative coefficient of the squared 
Tenure term.  
Insert Table 9 here 
The relationship between board tenure and firm value may also change with firm size, consistent 
with the well-documented size anomaly (e.g., Fama and French (1993, 2014)). To ensure that the 
paper’s results are not driven by small-cap stocks, we re-perform our tests on the sub-samples of 
large-cap and small-cap stocks (we define large-cap companies as companies with market 
capitalization larger than the median market capitalization for the full sample in each year). The 
results in Panel A of Table 8 show that our findings hold both for large-cap and small-cap stocks: 
the board tenure has an inverted U-shape relationship with firm value for both sub-samples.          
6.2 Our Design Of Board Tenure Measure 
Another concern is that our main explanatory variable might be misspecified. Bonini et al. (2015) 
argue that using the average to capture the effect of long board tenure of the directors might be 
confounding the effect of a single long tenure, as it gets diluted by the tenure of the other board 
members with short or average tenures. To ensure that the paper’s results are not driven by our 
choice of the main explanatory variable, we perform several additional robustness checks. 
First, we replace the average board tenure with the median board tenure in our tests. Panel B1 of 
Table 8 presents the results of our baseline regression, using median as our main explanatory 
variable (Med Tenure). The coefficient on Med Tenure is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
while the coefficient on the squared term is negative and significant. In unreported results we also 
find that using median board tenure results also shows that the negative effect of the squared term 
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is especially pronounced for high-growth firms. The results show that our findings are robust to 
using median as an alternative main explanatory variable. 
Insert Table 9 here 
Second, in order to further address the criticism that average board tenure might be a noisy 
measure, we examine whether our results are robust to different levels of standard deviation of 
board tenure. We separate our sample based on the median value of standard deviation of board 
tenure and re-run our baseline regression for the two sub-samples. Panel B1 shows the results for 
firms with high and low standard deviation of board tenure. Tenure and Tenure Squared terms 
retain their signs consistent with the main findings for both companies with high and low standard 
deviations of board tenure.   
Finally, we test the effect of long board tenure on firm performance by using the proportion of 
long-serving directors as a dependent variable. For each company, we calculate the number of 
directors with tenure greater than 15 years9 (“long-serving directors”) and divide it by the total 
number of directors on the board in that year. We re-run regression (1) replacing average board 
tenure terms with the percentage of long-serving directors. The resulting coefficient on the 
dependent variable of interest is negative and significant at the 1% level, which supports our earlier 
conclusion that extreme terms of board tenure are detrimental to the firm values. 
Our main results might also be driven by companies with extremely low board tenure. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, companies that belong to the first decile of the average board tenure have 
significantly lower market-to-book than the ones in deciles two or three. In order to address the 
                                                          
9 Our choice of 15 years is consistent with the average value for the top decile in Figure 2. This cutoff point is also 
consistent with the definition of long-tenured directors in Bonini et al. (2015). 
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criticism that our results might be driven by these outliers, we re-run our main results excluding 
firms that fall into decile one of average board tenure. The first column of Panel B2 shows that our 
results still hold if we restrict our test sample in this way: Tenure and Tenure Squared terms retain 
their signs and remain statistically significant at the 1% level. We further test the sensitivity of our 
results to the presence of low board-tenure companies in our sample by excluding firms both in 
decile one and two from our sample: the results are presented in column two of Panel B2. Even 
though the statistical significance of both Tenure and Tenure Squared terms weakens, the direction 
of the relationship between them and firm value remains unchanged. 
6.3 Use of Linear Model  
Standard linear models might be inappropriate to capture the relationship between firm value and 
a corporate governance construct due to potential nonlinearities between corporate governance 
measures and other variables. In order to address this concern, we perform an additional test to 
confirm that the reversal in the relationship between board tenure and firm value is correctly 
captured by the squared Tenure term.  
We partition our sample into two groups. Each year, we create a high board tenure group of firms, 
and a corresponding low board tenure group. High board tenure firms are the ones that have 
average board tenure that exceeds the 75th percentile of board tenure for that year; low board tenure 
firms are the rest of the firms in our sample. We then estimate Model (1) as a panel regression, and 
also in a cross-sectional form, for each group of firms. We modify Model (1) by excluding the 
squared board tenure term because we would like to capture the point where the linear relationship 
between board tenure and firm value changes by creating the two groups of firms. Panel C of Table 
8 presents the results of our test. We find that for our low board tenure sample board tenure is 
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positively and significantly related to firm value. However, for our high board tenure sample, board 
tenure is negatively and significantly related to firm value. These results confirm our findings that 
board tenure and firm value are positively related, with the relationship reversing at longer terms 
of board tenure. 
Insert Table 9 here 
6.4 Adverse Selection of Long-Tenured Board Members 
It may be argued that long-tenured board members remain on their boards because they are not 
offered better board memberships on other firms, and therefore cannot upgrade their board 
memberships into more prestigious boards (similar to the lemon argument by Akerlof (1970)). To 
assess whether this is the case, we identify all cases in our universe where a board member has 
added another board membership during the year. We then compare the new board membership to 
an average of the prior board memberships along several dimensions.  
In unreported results, we find that the new firm that is added is typically smaller in terms of market 
value than the average firm in which the board member had membership in the prior year. It also 
is less profitable in terms of ROE, net income scaled by book value of equity, and has a lower B/M 
(book to market value of equity) ratio. We find a similar pattern when a board membership is 
dropped. The dropped firm is typically smaller and has lower ROE and B/M ratio than the 
remaining firms in which the board member retains membership.  
We also examine the average tenure of board members who added one more board membership, 
and compare it to the average tenure of all other board members in the same firms. We find that 
the person who added a board membership had a board tenure that was shorter than the average of 
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other members by just 0.3 years. Thus, our data does not support the conjecture that inferior board 
members remain on the board because they are not offered better opportunities. 
6.5 Board Tenure and Annual Stock Returns 
Our tests of board tenure and monthly stock returns are consistent with the prevailing asset pricing 
methodology. However, it can be argued that because board tenure variable is measured annually, 
next year annual stock returns might be a more appropriate dependent variable for the tests. To 
address this, we re-run our tests of stock returns and board tenure using excess annual stock returns 
as a dependent variable. Table 9 presents the results for all four specifications. Tenure term remains 
positive and significant, as we add firm and board controls, while Tenure Squared is consistently 
negative and significant in most specifications. These results confirm our prior findings regarding 
the relationship between board tenure and stock returns.      
Insert Table 10 here 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Understanding the relationship between average board tenure and firm value is of fundamental 
importance to practitioners, academics and regulators. Calls of institutional and activist investors 
to “refresh the boards” and limit director tenure are shaping the regulatory environment. But these 
actions are not supported by a consistent set of results in the corporate governance literature.  
This paper studies the value relevance of board tenure using the largest sample of firms compared 
to previous studies in the literature. We find considerable support for the notion that longer board 
tenure is positively related to future stock returns, as well as contemporaneous and future firm 
value. The market rewards firms with long-serving boards with a ‘stability’ premium. However, 
over time, the effectiveness of two primary board functions – monitoring and advising 
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management – deteriorates. Tenure has a direct negative effect on the boards’ ability to keep up 
with the firm growth and a moderating effect on the board’s incentive to monitor managers. 
Effectiveness of board members peaks at average tenure of about nine years, at which point board 
tenure begins to become a drag on the company valuation relative to the nine-year tenure. This 
reduction in effectiveness is especially pronounced for high-growth firms for which up-to-date 
knowledge of company operations is especially important for the company’s success.  
We add to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, our findings are less prone to the biases 
that characterize prior studies in the area: our large sample of firms across 20 years and various 
industries addresses some of the small sample issues of prior studies. Second, we use forward-
looking measures of firm value to test the value-relevance of board tenure in an attempt to mitigate 
the endogeneity problem. Third, we examine the effect of board tenure on firm returns, which 
allows us to suggest a viable portfolio strategy based on the length of board tenure. Finally, we 
provide some evidence regarding the effect of tenure on high growth firms that partially explains 
the nonlinear relationship between board tenure and firm value.  
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Figure 1 Sample Size  
 
Figure 1 plots the number of firms over the sample period. We require firms to be founded at least 
five years before we begin tracking their board tenure. Also, we require a market value in excess 
of $100 million, a minimum of three members on the board, and a positive book value.  
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Figure 2 Average and Median Board Tenure by Deciles 
 
Figure 2 plots average and median board tenure (in years) for groups of firms formed based on 
board tenure. We rank firms each year into deciles based on the board tenure for each firm. The 
average and median tenure is calculated for each decile.  
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Figure 3 Market-to-Book Sorted by Tenure Deciles  
 
Figure 3 plots median Market-to-Book value for portfolios of firms formed based on the board 
tenure. Market-to-Book values are annually adjusted by subtracting the median value for the 
industry, using Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Portfolios are formed by ranking firms 
each year into deciles based on the average board tenure for the firm.   
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Figure 4 Excess Returns on Firms Sorted by Tenure Deciles 
 
Figure 4 plots average excess returns (XRET), characteristic adjusted returns (DGTW RET), and 
risk-adjusted returns (FF RET) for portfolios of firms formed based on the average board tenure. 
The portfolios are formed by ranking firms each month into deciles based on the average board 
tenure for the firm.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
The table below provides descriptive statistics for our key variables. The sample consists of all firms on Capital IQ database for the years 
1996-2016. The board information is from Capital IQ, financial information is from Compustat, and market information is from the CRSP 
database. Tenure is the average of the tenure of all independent directors sitting on the board. An individual director’s tenure is calculated 
as the year of annual meeting minus the start year of directorship minus any breaks in the service of directorship. Med Tenure is the median 
of the tenure of all independent directors sitting on the board. Std Tenure is the standard deviation of the tenure of all independent directors 
sitting on the board. Average Age is the average age of board members. Board Size is the number of directors. Connections is the average 
number of boards the board members serve on (including the firm observation). Chair CEO is an indicator variable that equals to one when 
the CEO also serves as board chair, zero otherwise. Market cap is the market value of equity. Book value is the book value of equity. Book-
to-market is book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. RET are the one-month ahead buy and hold security returns from 
CRSP. DGTW RET are one-month ahead abnormal returns calculated as the monthly buy and hold security returns from CRSP minus the 
value-weighted average buy and hold return on securities with the same size (market capitalization, 3 groups), Book/Market (3 groups) 
and 11-month momentum (3 groups). StdRet is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the prior calendar year. Firm Age (years) 
is the number of years since the firm is first listed in CRSP database. Sales are 12-month sales for a company.  SegNum is the number of 
business segments. Intangibles are total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is long-term and short-term debt divided 
by lagged total assets. ROA is operating income before depreciation over the prior four quarters divided by lagged total asset. R&D is 
research and development expenditures from the prior four quarters divided by sales from the prior four quarters. Sales Growth1 is the 
growth in the most recent four quarters of sales over the previous four quarters. Sales Growth3 is growth of the most recent four quarters 
of sales over the corresponding period three years ago. Fluidity is the fluidity score obtained from the online data 
(http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/industryconcen.htm) provided by Hoberg and Phillips. Market-to-book is market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity. The Correlation column reports correlation between board tenure and other variables. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median Std Dev p25 p75 Correlation  
Board Characteristics        
Tenure (years) 638,717 6.65 6.00 3.89 3.83 8.83  
Med Tenure (years) 638,717 5.95 5.00 4.14 3.00 8.00 0.8676*** 
Std Tenure (years) 638,717 4.94 4.32 3.31 2.50 6.73 0.7763*** 
Average Age (years) 638,717 58.55 58.86 6.21 55.20 62.14 0.4681*** 
Board Size 638,717 7.00 7.00 2.86 5.00 9.00 0.1838*** 
Connections 638,717 2.80 1.80 0.78 1.33 2.44 -0.0973*** 
Chair CEO 638,717 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.0651*** 
        
Firm Characteristics        
Market cap 638,717 5911.50 805.02 21551.44 290.64 2953.73 0.0634*** 
Book value 638,717 2666.34 392.85 10737.63 139.53 1329.40 0.0939*** 
Book-to-market 638,717 0.54 0.48 1.72 0.27 0.72 0.0652*** 
RET 638,717 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.0207*** 
DGTW RET 638,717 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.05 0.05 0.0221*** 
StdRet 638,717 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.1962*** 
Firm Age (years) 638,717 45.72 28.00 42.42 15.00 67.00 0.3422*** 
Sales 584,353 4467.86 657.95 18075.20 193.82 2379.10 0.0788*** 
SegNum 501,810 2.61 2.00 1.83 1.00 4.00 0.1063*** 
Intangibles 558,489 0.76 0.85 0.24 0.63 0.95  0.0025 
Leverage 584,353 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.37 -0.0334*** 
ROAt 638,717 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.0657*** 
ROAt-1 638,717 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.0687*** 
        
Growth Proxies        
R&D 584,353 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.03 -0.1159*** 
Sales Growth1 616,007 0.13 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.22 -0.1347*** 
Sales Growth3 616,007 0.56 0.31 0.77 0.05 0.83 -0.2061*** 
Fluidity 475,358 7.33 6.60 3.94 4.49 9.37 -0.1578*** 
Market-to-Book 638,717 6.30 2.15 3.12 1.38 3.67 -0.0572*** 
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Panel B: Correlations for Growth Proxies 
 R&D Sales Growth1 Sales Growth3 Fluidity Market-to-Book 
R&D 1     
Sales Growth1 0.0882*** 1    
Sales Growth3 0.1121*** 0.6031*** 1   
Fluidity 0.2105*** 0.1038*** 0.1487*** 1  
Market-to-Book 0.2664*** 0.2357*** 0.2138*** -0.0181*** 1 
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Table 2 
Impact of Board Tenure on Contemporaneous Firm Market Value 
 
The table reports regression results of contemporaneous market-to-book on director, firm, and board characteristics. The regression specification is 
as follows: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡        =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
In all regression iterations the dependent variable is contemporaneous market-to-book ratio. Tenure is the average of the tenure of all independent 
directors sitting on the board. An individual director’s tenure is calculated as the year of annual meeting minus the start year of directorship minus 
any breaks in the service of directorship. Firm Age (years) is the number of years since the firm is first listed in CRSP database. Sales are 12-month 
sales for a company. SegNum is the number of business segments. Intangibles are total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is 
long-term and short-term debt divided by lagged total assets. R&D is research and development expenditures from the prior four quarters divided 
by sales from the prior four quarters. ROA is operating income before depreciation over the prior four quarters divided by lagged total asset. StdRet 
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the prior calendar year. Average Age is the average age of board members. Board Size is the 
number of directors. Connections is the average number of boards the board members serve on (including the firm observation). Chair CEO is an 
indicator variable that equals to one when the CEO also serves as board chair, zero otherwise. Stand denotes that for regression purposes a variable 
was normalized using the Blom function which transforms a variable to a normal distribution with a range between plus and minus three. In Panel 
B we chose to show only the coefficients on Log (Tenure) and Log (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)2 with all other controls suppressed. In Panel B the t-statistic for the 
average coefficient is computed using the Fama and Macbeth methodology. Fama and French‘s 48 industry definitions are used for the industry 
fixed effects. The T-statistics are in parentheses and statistically significant terms are bolded. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.  
 
Panel A: Panel regression  
 Dependent Variable = Contemporaneous Market/ Book Ratio (stand.) 
 1 2 3 4 
Log (Tenure) -0.0042 0.3105*** 0.2217*** 0.1307*** 
 (-0.43) (6.89) (5.24) (2.60) 
Log (Tenure)2  -0.0877*** -0.0751*** -0.0439*** 
  (-7.16) (-6.51) (-3.21) 
Log (Firm Age)   -0.0006 0.0022 
   (-0.09) (0.28) 
Log (Sales)   -0.0449*** -0.0813*** 
   (-12.71) (-19.21) 
Log (SegNum)   -0.0557*** -0.0465*** 
   (-4.77) (-3.65) 
Intangibles (stand.)   0.0323*** 0.0236*** 
   (4.13) (2.73) 
Leverage (stand.)   0.0709*** 0.0654*** 
   (12.76) (10.65) 
R&D (stand.)   0.3130*** 0.2838*** 
   (33.46) (27.92) 
ROAt (stand.)   0.4127*** 0.4226*** 
   (46.12) (43.44) 
ROAt-1 (stand.)   -0.0529*** -0.0516*** 
   (-6.02) (-5.39) 
StdRet (stand.)           -0.0155**  -0.0164** 
   (-2.48) (-2.39) 
Log (Average Age)    -0.3991*** 
    (-5.43) 
Log (Board Size)    0.1325*** 
    (6.58) 
Log (Connections)    0.4143*** 
    (16.42) 
Chair CEO    0.0376*** 
    (3.56) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 34,583 34,583 34,583 34,583 
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Panel B: Annual Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 Log (Tenure) Log (Tenure)2 
Year 2 3 4 2 3 4 
1996 -0.3097 -0.1733 -0.1976 0.0399 -0.0064 0.0084 
 (-0.98) (-0.57) (-0.65) (0.47) (-0.08) (0.10) 
1997 -0.0710 -0.1894 -0.1738 -0.0054 0.0276 0.0287 
 (-0.23) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.06) (0.36) (0.36) 
1998 0.3218 0.2266 0.1380 -0.1224* -0.0891 -0.0492 
 (1.35) (1.02) (0.62) (-1.84) (-1.43) (-0.77) 
1999 0.2431 -0.0603 -0.1411 -0.0905 -0.0050 0.0263 
 (0.95) (-0.26) (-0.61) (-1.29) (-0.08) (0.41) 
2000 0.5279** 0.4178** 0.3518 -0.1591** -0.1135* -0.0873 
 (2.20) (1.85) (1.55) (-2.46) (-1.86) (-1.42) 
2001 0.6047*** 0.3347 0.3085 -0.1759*** -0.1083* -0.0905 
 (2.69) (1.62) (1.49) (-2.84) (-1.90) (-1.58) 
2002 0.5970*** 0.3358* 0.2920 -0.1514*** -0.0947* -0.0778 
 (3.04) (1.86) (1.62) (-2.76) (-1.87) (-1.53) 
2003 0.6810*** 0.3581* 0.2242 -0.1598*** -0.0998* -0.0482 
 (3.25) (1.90) (1.19) (-2.77) (-1.91) (-0.91) 
2004 0.5143*** 0.4096** 0.2783 -0.1608*** -0.1313*** -0.0806* 
 (2.83) (2.37) (1.60) (-3.22) (-2.76) (-1.67) 
2005 0.7230*** 0.5413*** 0.4142** -0.2015*** -0.1681*** -0.1176** 
 (3.36) (2.67) (2.03) (-3.48) (-3.07) (-2.12) 
2006 0.7655*** 0.7355*** 0.5979*** -0.2281*** -0.2274*** -0.1779*** 
 (3.76) (3.80) (3.07) (-4.19) (-4.38) (-3.39) 
2007 0.5472*** 0.4501** 0.3696* -0.1627*** -0.1479*** -0.1083** 
 (2.60) (2.26) (1.85) (-2.91) (-2.78) (-2.02) 
2008 0.5976*** 0.4669** 0.3745* -0.1657*** -0.1448*** -0.1001* 
 (2.65) (2.20) (1.76) (-2.78) (-2.59) (-1.77) 
2009 0.6358** 0.4563** 0.3255 -0.1471** -0.1205** -0.0659 
 (2.54) (2.02) (1.42) (-2.28) (-2.07) (-1.11) 
2010 0.5184** 0.3343 0.1125 -0.1418** -0.1094* -0.0343 
 (1.98) (1.36) (0.46) (-2.13) (-1.75) (-0.55) 
2011 1.3888*** 1.1230*** 0.9823*** -0.3282*** -0.2798*** -0.2292*** 
 (5.08) (4.40) (3.82) (-4.81) (-4.39) (-3.56) 
2012 0.9143*** 0.7846*** 0.6836*** -0.2093*** -0.1974*** -0.1618*** 
 (3.53) (3.28) (2.82) (-3.21) (-3.28) (-2.64) 
2013 1.1246*** 1.1072*** 0.9663*** -0.2550*** -0.2721*** -0.2210*** 
 (4.18) (4.40) (3.82) (-3.80) (-4.32) (-3.47) 
2014 1.2334* 0.6786 0.3594 -0.3340* -0.2048 -0.0925 
 (1.70) (0.97) (0.51) (-1.90) (-1.20) (-0.54) 
2015 0.1956 0.1790 -0.0079 -0.0283 -0.0295 0.0323 
 (0.81) (0.80) (-0.03) (-0.46) (-0.52) (0.55) 
2016 2.1484** 0.9977 0.5117 -0.5272** -0.3012 -0.1844 
 (2.15) (1.11) (0.56) (-2.25) (-1.43) (-0.86) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
N 34,583 34,583 34,583 34,583 34,583 34,583 
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Table 3 
Impact of Board Tenure on the Next Year Firm Market Value 
 
The table reports regression results of forward market-to-book on director, firm, and board characteristics. The regression specification is 
as follows: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡+1   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡   . 
 
In all regression iterations the dependent variable is the next-year market-to-book ratio. In all regressions we also control for current year 
market-to-book. Tenure is the average of the tenure of all independent directors sitting on the board. An individual director’s tenure is 
calculated as the year of annual meeting minus the start year of directorship minus any breaks in the service of directorship. Firm Age 
(years) is the number of years since the firm is first listed in CRSP database. Sales are 12-month sales for a company. SegNum is the 
number of business segments. Intangibles are total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is long-term and short-term 
debt divided by lagged total assets. R&D is research and development expenditures from the prior four quarters divided by sales from the 
prior four quarters. ROA is operating income before depreciation over the prior four quarters divided by lagged total asset. StdRet is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns during the prior calendar year. Average Age is the average age of board members. Board Size is 
the number of directors. Connections is the average number of boards the board members serve on (including the firm observation). Chair 
CEO is an indicator variable that equals to one when the CEO also serves as board chair, zero otherwise Stand denotes that for regression 
purposes a variable was normalized using the Blom function which transforms a variable to a normal distribution with a range between 
plus and minus three. Industry fixed effect is at Fama French’s 48 industries classification. The T-statistics are in parentheses and 
statistically significant terms are bolded. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 Dependent Variable = Forward Market/ Book (stand.) 
 1 2 3 4 
Log (Tenure) 0.0729*** 0.2459*** 0.2031*** 0.1731*** 
 (10.94) (8.11) (6.72) (4.82) 
Log (Tenure)2  -0.0482*** -0.0416*** -0.0348*** 
  (-5.85) (-5.04) (-3.57) 
Market/Book (stand.) 0.7941*** 0.7933*** 0.7844*** 0.7818*** 
 (219.14) (218.87) (203.48) (183.37) 
Log (Firm Age)   0.0179*** 0.0133** 
   (3.53) (2.36) 
Log (Sales)   0.0254*** 0.0147*** 
   (9.99) (4.84) 
Log (SegNum)   -0.0257** -0.0224** 
   (-3.08) (-2.46) 
Intangibles (stand.)   -0.0199*** -0.0216*** 
   (-3.54) (-3.50) 
Leverage (stand.)   0.0010 0.0032 
   (0.26) (0.72) 
R&D (stand.)   0.0687*** 0.0624*** 
   (10.08) (8.34) 
ROAt (stand.)   -0.0219*** -0.0255*** 
   (-3.33) (-3.55) 
ROAt-1 (stand.)   0.0485*** 0.0516*** 
   (7.72) (7.55) 
StdRet (stand.)   -0.0252 -0.0223*** 
   (-5.60) (-4.54) 
Log (Average Age)    0.0066 
    (0.13) 
Log (Board Size)    0.0294** 
    (2.04) 
Log (Connections)    0.1321*** 
    (7.29) 
Chair CEO    -0.0064 
    (-0.86) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 34,082 34,082 34,082 34,082 
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Table 4 
Impact of Growth Options on the Value Relevance of Board Tenure: Market Valuation Evidence 
 
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is contemporaneous market-to-book ratio. In each column we 
report results of the following specification that includes one of our four proxies for firm growth: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡  
 
We use four proxies for firm growth: (i) R&D, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s ratio of research and development 
expenses to sales is over the 75th percentile value for all firms for that year. (ii) SalesGrowth1, which is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm’s sales growth in the most recent four quarters over the previous four quarters is above the median value of other firms for the 
year. (iii) SalesGrowth3, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s sales growth of the most recent four quarters over the 
corresponding period three years ago is above the median value of other firms for the year. (iv) Fluidity is an indicator variable equal to 
one if firm’s Fluidity score is above the median value of other firms for the year. Fluidity is the fluidity score obtained from the online data 
(http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/industryconcen.htm) provided by Hoberg and Phillips. All board and firm control variables are 
as defined in Table 2. In the interest of conciseness, we report only the results on the key independent variables. Panel A reports the results 
of panel regression. Industry fixed effect is at Fama French’s 48 industries classification. The T-statistics are in parentheses and statistically 
significant terms are bolded. Panel B reports the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions. Panel B reports average coefficients from 21 
annual cross-sectional regressions. The averages are time-series means with t-statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error 
of the mean; statistically significant terms are bolded. N denotes the average number of cross-sectional observations. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Panel Regression  
 Dependent Variable = Contemporaneous Market to Book (stand.) 
 Growth Option Proxy = 
 R&D Sales Growth1 Sales Growth3 Fluidity 
Growth × Log (Tenure)2 -0.0205*** -0.0201*** -0.0022 -0.0119** 
 (-3.31) (-3.87) (-0.41) (-2.13) 
Log (Tenure) 0.1424*** 0.1306*** 0.1470*** 0.1354*** 
 (2.96) (2.77) (3.08) (2.81) 
Log (Tenure)2 -0.0393*** -0.0336*** -0.0447*** -0.0382*** 
 (-3.01) (-2.59) (-3.42) (-2.91) 
Growth Option Proxy 0.0749** 0.4245*** 0.2396*** 0.0771*** 
 (2.09) (18.05) (10.01) (3.08) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,583 34,583 34,583 34,583 
 
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regression  
 Dependent Variable = Contemporaneous Market to Book (stand.) 
 Growth Option Proxy = 
 R&D Sales Growth1 Sales Growth3 Fluidity 
Growth × Log (Tenure)2 -0.0192*** -0.0216*** -0.0027 -0.0072 
 (-3.53) (-2.94) (-0.35) (-1.08) 
Log (Tenure) 0.1809** 0.1652** 0.1993*** 0.1754** 
 (2.49) (2.54) (2.84) (2.42) 
Log (Tenure)2 -0.0569*** -0.0490*** -0.0654*** -0.0570*** 
 (-3.28) (-3.25) (-3.85) (-3.38) 
Growth Option Proxy   -0.654    0.4461*** 0.2771*** 0.0572 
 (0.71) (11.98) (6.06) (1.56) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646 
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Table 5 
Abnormal Stocks Returns to Portfolios Sorted by Board Tenure 
 
The first two columns presents average monthly excess returns (X_RET) and characteristic adjusted returns (DGTW_RET) for quintiles 
and deciles of portfolios formed based on Tenure. X_RET are monthly buy and hold security returns from CRSP in excess of the value-
weighted market portfolio. DGTW_RET are characteristic-adjusted returns calculated as the monthly buy and hold security returns from 
CRSP minus the value-weighted average buy and hold return on securities with the same size (market capitalization, 3 groups), 
Book/Market (3 groups) and 11-month momentum (3 groups). The remaining columns show the results of Fama-French regressions for 
quintiles and deciles of portfolios formed based on Tenure. The regressions have the following specification: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝑏 ∙ [𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡] + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡   
 
Dependent variables are portfolio returns, Rpt, in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate, Rft, observed at the beginning of the month. 
The intercept denotes the risk adjusted return, FF_RET. Each month we form equal-weighted portfolios of all sample firms based the 
length of directors’ tenure (Tenure). The three Fama-French factors are zero investment portfolios representing the excess return of the 
market, Rm-Rf; the difference between a portfolio of ‘‘small’’ stocks and ‘‘big’’ stocks, SMB; and the difference between a portfolio of 
‘‘high’’ book-to-market stocks and ‘‘low’’ book-to-market stocks, HML. The fourth factor, UMD, is the difference between a portfolio of 
stocks with high past one-year returns and a portfolio of stocks with low past one-year returns. The number of monthly cross-sectional 
regressions is denoted by N and t-statistics are in parentheses; statistically significant terms are bolded. 
 
  
 
Average 
X_RET 
 
Average  
DGTW 
_RET 
 
Fama-French Regressions 
 
 Intercept 
(FF_RET) 
Rm - Rf SMB HML UMD 𝑅2/ N 
Panel A: Tenure Quintile Portfolios        
         
1 (Low) -0.13% -0.26% -0.27% 1.0703 0.5857 0.1386 -0.1638 0.9346 
 (-0.77) (-2.55) (-2.66) (44.66) (19.18) (4.18) (-8.14) 246 
2 0.09% -0.03% -0.07% 1.0379 0.5272 0.2618 -0.1122 0.9431 
 (0.60) (-0.37) (-0.79) (49.84) (19.87) (9.10) (-6.42) 246 
3 0.30% 0.17% 0.16% 0.9831 0.4736 0.3549 -0.0854 0.9389 
 (2.20) (1.86) (1.86) (48.82) (18.46) (12.75) (-5.05) 246 
4 0.32% 0.18% 0.19% 0.9388 0.4334 0.3901 -0.0736 0.9501 
 (2.49) (1.95) (2.65) (54.77) (19.85) (16.47) (-5.12) 246 
5 (High) 0.37% 0.23% 0.24% 0.8896 0.4554 0.4810 -0.0604 0.9426 
 (2.64) (2.16) (3.22) (49.99) (20.09) (19.57) (-4.04) 246 
High - Low 0.50% 0.49% 0.51% -0.1808 -0.1303 0.3425 0.1034 0.5014 
 (3.21) (4.00) (4.46) (-6.65) (-3.76) (9.12) (4.53) 246 
       
Panel B: Tenure Decile Portfolios       
       
1 (Low) -0.33% -0.46% -0.48% 1.0884 0.6085 0.1017 -0.1577 0.9192 
 (-1.80) (-3.93) (-4.13) (39.70) (17.42) (2.69) (-6.85) 246 
2 0.07% -0.06% -0.06% 1.0521 0.5646 0.1751 -0.1698 0.9220 
 (0.42) (-0.60) (-0.53) (40.74) (17.16) (4.91) (-7.83) 246 
3 0.04% -0.08% -0.12% 1.0574 0.5467 0.2416 -0.1202 0.9337 
 (0.26) (-0.81) (-1.27) (45.66) (18.53) (7.55) (-6.18) 246 
4 0.14% 0.02% -0.01% 1.0183 0.5072 0.2831 -0.1037 0.9331 
 (0.93) (0.17) (-0.14) (45.99) (17.99) (9.26) (-5.58) 246 
5 0.20% 0.08% 0.05% 0.9924 0.4839 0.3548 -0.1008 0.9223 
 (1.35) (0.79) (0.53) (42.59) (16.30) (11.02) (-5.15) 246 
6 0.41% 0.26% 0.26% 0.9751 0.4621 0.3561 -0.0688 0.9367 
 (2.99) (2.79) (3.04) (48.31) (17.97) (12.77) (-4.06) 246 
7 0.32% 0.19% 0.19% 0.9424 0.4590 0.3731 -0.0723 0.9491 
 (2.43) (1.97) (2.52) (53.83) (20.58) (15.43) (-4.92) 246 
8 0.32% 0.17% 0.20% 0.9358 0.4069 0.4067 -0.0749 0.9342 
 (2.44) (1.80) (2.42) (47.57) (16.24) (14.96) (-4.54) 246 
9 0.37% 0.25% 0.24% 0.9017 0.4768 0.4430 -0.0741 0.9411 
 (2.62) (2.22) (3.13) (48.97) (20.33) (17.42) (-4.79) 246 
10 0.37% 0.21% 0.24% 0.8775 0.4338 0.5191 -0.0467 0.9237 
 (2.52) (1.91) (2.81) (43.18) (16.76) (18.49) (-2.74) 246 
High – Low 0.70% 0.66% 0.72% -0.2109 -0.1747 0.4174 0.1110 0.4843 
 (3.66) (4.40) (5.02) (-6.21) (-4.04) (8.90) (3.89) 246 
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Table 6 
Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions of Monthly Stock Returns 
 
The table reports regression results estimating variations of the following regression: 
 
𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+1   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
In all regression iterations the dependent variable is the one-month ahead excess stock return – DGTW_RET (characteristic adjusted returns 
calculated as the monthly buy and hold security returns from CRSP minus the value-weighted average buy and hold return on securities 
with the same size (market capitalization, 3 groups), Book/Market (3 groups) and 11-month momentum (3 groups)). Tenure is the average 
of the tenure of independent directors sitting on the board. An individual director’s tenure is calculated as the year of annual meeting minus 
the start year of directorship minus any breaks in the service of directorship. Firm Age (years) is the number of years since the firm is first 
listed in CRSP database. SegNum is the number of business segments. Intangibles are total intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. 
Leverage is long-term and short-term debt divided by lagged total assets. R&D is research and development expenditures from the prior 
four quarters divided by sales from the prior four quarters. ROA is operating income before depreciation over the prior four quarters divided 
by lagged total asset. StdRet is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the prior calendar year. Average Age is the average age 
of board members. Board Size is the number of directors. Connections is the average number of boards the board members serve on 
(including the firm observation). Chair CEO is an indicator variable that equals to one when the CEO also serves as board chair, zero 
otherwise. DGTW_RET is winsorized at 99% and 1%. The table reports average coefficients from 251 monthly cross-sectional regressions. 
The averages are time-series means with t-statistics (in parentheses) computed using the standard error of the mean; statistically significant 
terms are bolded. N denotes the average number of cross-sectional observations. Industry fixed effect is at Fama French’s 48 industries 
classification. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable = DGTW_RET  
 1 2 3 4 
Log (Tenure) 0.0030*** 0.0077*** 0.0071*** 0.0058** 
 (4.71) (3.20) (2.82) (2.43) 
Log (Tenure)2  -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0010 
  (-2.23) (-2.21) (-1.61) 
Log (Firm Age)   -0.0005 -0.0006 
   (-1.21) (-1.34) 
Log (SegNum)   0.0002 0.0003 
   (0.29) (0.38) 
Intangibles (stand.)   -0.0006 -0.0004 
   (-1.29) (-0.69) 
Leverage (stand.)   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   (-0.75) (-0.62) 
R&D (stand.)   0.0004 0.0003 
   (0.48) (0.36) 
ROA (stand.)   0.0019*** 0.0026*** 
   (2.73) (2.92) 
ROAt-1 (stand.)   0.0004 0.0000 
   (-0.59) (0.05) 
StdRet (stand.)   -0.0008 -0.0005 
   (-1.07) (-0.61) 
Log (Average Age)    -0.0063 
    (-1.58) 
Log (Board Size)    0.0012 
    (1.00) 
Log (Connections)    0.0054*** 
    (4.06) 
Chair CEO    -0.0004 
    (-0.74) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 
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Table 7 
Impact of Growth Options on the Value Relevance of Board Tenure: Stock Return Evidence 
 
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable, DGTW_RET, is one month ahead characteristic adjusted returns 
calculated as the monthly buy and hold security returns from CRSP minus the value-weighted average buy and hold return on securities 
with the same size (market capitalization, 3 groups), Book/Market (3 groups) and 11-month momentum (3 groups). In each column we 
report results of the following specification that includes one of our five proxies for firm growth:  
𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+1   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                                
We use five proxies for firm growth: (i) M/B is an indicator variable equal to one if firm’s market-to-book ratio is above the median value 
of other firms for the year. (ii) R&D, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s ratio of research and development expenses 
to sales is over the 75th percentile value for all firms for that year. (iii) SalesGrowth1, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s sales growth in the most recent four quarters over the previous four quarters is above the median value of other firms for the year. 
(iv) SalesGrowth3, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s sales growth of the most recent four quarters over the 
corresponding period three years ago is above the median value of other firms for the year. (v) Fluidity is an indicator variable equal to 
one if firm’s Fluidity score is above the median value of other firms for the year. Fluidity is the fluidity score obtained from the online data 
(http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/industryconcen.htm) provided by Hoberg and Phillips. All other control variables are as defined 
in Table 6. In the interest of conciseness, we report only the results on the key independent variables. DGTW_RET is winsorized at 99% 
and 1%. The table reports average coefficients from 251 monthly cross-sectional regressions. The averages are time-series means with t-
statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of the mean; statistically significant terms are bolded. N denotes the average 
number of cross-sectional observations. Industry fixed effect is at Fama French’s 48 industries classification. ***, **,* denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level.    
  
 
Dependent Variable = DGTW_RET  
  
 
Growth Option Proxy = 
   
M/B 
 
R&D 
 
Sales Growth1 
 
Sales Growth3 
 
Fluidity 
 
Growth × Log (Tenure)2  -0.0004* -0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 
  (-1.70) (-0.49) (0.67) (1.46) (0.08) 
Log (Tenure)  0.0058** 0.0056** 0.0060** 0.0055** 0.0059** 
  (2.43) (2.34) (2.49) (2.30) (2.44) 
Log (Tenure)2  -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0010 
  (-1.25) (-1.46) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.52) 
Growth Option Proxy  -0.0007 0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0024* 0.0013 
  (-0.44) (0.47) (-1.15) (-1.76) (0.88) 
Firm Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 
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Table 8 
Board Tenure Sorted Portfolios: Implied Expected Return 
This table shows the implied expected return for tenure-sorted portfolios. Each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their average board tenure. The ranked 
stocks are assigned to one of ten portfolios (P1-P10). For each portfolio, each month we compute the implied expected return as the ratio of target price to current prices minus 1. Target price 
is computed using the I/B/E/S mean and median consensus for each stock scaled by book equity. The rightmost columns report the difference between portfolios 10 and 1 and the corresponding 
t-statistic; 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.    
 P1 
(Low) 
P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
(High) 
H-L H-L 
(stats) 
Implied Expected Return             
Mean 0.51 0.38 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.35 -0.16 -2.58 
Median 0.50 0.37 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.13 -0.37 -2.43 
N 44,616 47,454 47,365 48,856 49,220 48,632 48,679 48,111 45,957 41,370 470,260  
             
Mean Tenure 1.40 2.96 3.96 4.83 5.71 6.65 7.68 8.96 10.72 14.71 13.31  
Median Tenure 1.38 2.92 3.80 4.67 5.56 6.50 7.67 9.00 10.70 14.00 12.62  
N 66,415 66,677 66,179 66,459 66,123 66,400 66,122 66,435 66,361 66,230 663,401  
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Table 9 
Robustness Tests: Market-to-Book Evidence 
 
The table reports regression results of contemporaneous market-to-book on director, firm, and board characteristics. Dependent variable is 
Market/ Book and is normalized using the Blom function which transforms a variable to a normal distribution with a range between plus 
and minus three. Unless otherwise stated, the regressions contain same set of control variables as in Table 2 Column 4. Panel A separates 
our sample in two ways: the earlier period (1996-2003) vs. later period (2004-2014) and large-cap stocks vs. small-cap stocks. Panel B1 
uses median board tenure (Med Tenure) and its square in the regression as an alternative measure of board tenure, and it also tests the 
robustness of our results to the standard deviation of board tenure (High Std Tenure vs. Low Std Tenure). Panel B2 omits two groups of 
companies: column one excludes companies that are ranked into the decile one of average board tenure and column two excludes companies 
that are ranked into decile one or two of average board tenure. Panel C separates our sample in high and low board tenure stocks and omits 
squared tenure term in the regression to test the robustness of linear model use. In the interest of conciseness, we report only the results on 
the key independent variables. All other control variables are as defined in Table 2. Fama and French‘s 48 industry definitions are used for 
the industry fixed effects. The T-statistics are in parentheses and statistically significant terms are bolded. ***, **,* denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection. 
 1996-2003 period 2004-2014 period Large-Cap Small-Cap 
Log (Tenure) 0.1003 0.4967*** 0.2262*** 0.3345*** 
 (1.21) (5.89) (3.69) (4.61) 
Log (Tenure)2 -0.0362* -0.1263 -0.0489*** -0.1010 
 (-2.04) (-6.63) (-2.96) (-5.20) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,024 23,226 16,296 14,957 
 
Panel B1: Design of Board Tenure Measure. 
 Median Tenure High Std Tenure Low Std Tenure 
Log (Tenure) 0.1048*** 0.2934 0.1215 
 (3.20) (1.42) (1.56) 
Log (Tenure)2 -0.0270*** -0.0901* -0.0072 
 (-2.81)  (-2.00) (-0.29) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 31,253 16,044 15,209 
 
Panel B2: Design of Board Tenure Measure. 
 Excluding D1 Excluding D1-D2 
Log (Tenure) 0.4199*** 0.2527 
 (3.83) (1.61) 
Log (Tenure)2 -0.1088*** -0.0740** 
 (-4.15) (-2.08) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
N 28,625 25,572 
 
Panel C: Use of Linear Model. 
 High Board 
Tenure 
Low Board 
Tenure 
Log (Tenure) -0.2059*** 0.1290*** 
 (-3.77) (6.88) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
N 7,842 23,411 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Table 10 
Robustness Tests: Annual Stock Returns Evidence 
 
The table reports regression results estimating variations of the following regression: 
 
𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡+1   =  𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡. 
 
In all regression iterations the dependent variable is the one-year ahead excess stock return – DGTW_RET (characteristic adjusted returns 
calculated as the annual buy and hold security returns from CRSP minus the value-weighted average buy and hold return on securities with 
the same size (market capitalization, 3 groups), Book/Market (3 groups) and 11-month momentum (3 groups)). All independent variables 
are as defined in Table 6. In the interest of conciseness, we report only the results on the key independent variables. DGTW_RET is 
winsorized at 99% and 1%. The table reports average coefficients from 21 annual cross-sectional regressions. The averages are time-series 
means with t-statistics (in parentheses) corresponding to the standard error of the mean; statistically significant terms are bolded. N denotes 
the average number of cross-sectional observations. Industry fixed effect is at Fama French’s 48 industries classification. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.    
 
 
 
Dependent Variable = DGTW_RETit+1   
 1 2 3 4 
Log (Tenure) 0.0300*** 0.1108*** 0.0964*** 0.0800** 
 (2.92) (3.40) (3.02) (2.60) 
Log (Tenure)2  -0.0211*** -0.0180** -0.0102 
  (-2.77) (-2.53) (-1.54) 
Firm Controls No No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 
 
 
